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From the Legal Literature
Francesca Laguardia, J.D., Ph.D.*
THE LEGAL DIVIDE BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM—DO WE NEED A
DOMESTIC TERROR STATUTE?
I. INTRODUCTION
There is an ongoing debate as to whether the federal government
of the United States should pass a domestic terrorism statute.1 This
debate is founded on frustration with the current criminal legal
mechanisms for addressing extremist violence. Mary McCord sum-
marizes this frustration, asking why
are Islamist extremists who commit violent crimes in the United States
with the intent to intimidate and coerce—or who merely send money or
other support to Islamist extremist groups like al-Qaeda or the Islamic
State—charged with crimes of international terrorism, while anti-
Semites like Robert Bower and white supremacists like Dylann Roof—
who killed nine black parishioners at a Charleston, South Carolina
church in 2015—are charged with hate crimes but not domestic terror-
ism?2
Thus far, the discussion has occurred primarily in the realms of
*Associate Professor, Justice Studies at Montclair State University in New
Jersey. Received J.D. from New York University School of Law, and Ph.D. from
New York University’s Institute for Law and Society.
1See, e.g., Mary B. McCord & Jason Blazakis, A Road Map for Congress to
Address Domestic Terrorism, LAWFARE (Feb. 27, 2019, 8:00AM), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/road-map-congress-address-domestic-terrorism; Jason M. Blazakis,
American Terrorists: Why Current Laws Are Inadequate for Violent Extremists at
Home, LAWFARE (Dec. 2, 2019, 10:00AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/american-terr
orists-why-current-laws-are-inadequate-violent-extremists-home; Mary B. McCord,
It’s Time for Congress to Make Domestic Terrorism a Federal Crime, LAWFARE (Dec.
5, 2018, 9:13AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-congress-make-domestic-te
rrorism-federal-crime; Susan Hennessey, The Good Reasons to Not Charge All Ter-
rorists with Terrorism, LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2015, 11:34AM), https://www.lawfareblog.co
m/good-reasons-not-charge-all-terrorists-terrorism; Michael German, Why New
Laws Aren’t Needed to Take Domestic Terrorism Seriously, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/why-new-laws-arent-needed-ta
ke-domestic-terrorism-more-seriously; Adam Goldman, F.B.I., Pushing to Stop
Domestic Terrorists, Grapples With Limits on Its Power, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/politics/fbi-domestic-terrorism.html (describ-
ing ongoing debate).
2McCord, supra note 1.
1094 © 2019 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 55 No. 6
popular media and legal blogs.3 Since August, federal legislators
have begun considering a new domestic terrorism statute that would
criminalize less specified terrorist activities.4 While legal scholars
have criticized unequal application of the label of terrorism in the
media and in criminal prosecutions, few have ventured into the hard
legal distinctions between “domestic” and “international” terrorism,
and their ramifications.5 The following two articles examine these
distinctions in depth, and while they largely agree that the differ-
ences are problematic, they come to contradictory answers as to the
proposed solution.
II. WHY DYLANN ROOF IS A TERRORIST UNDER FEDERAL LAW, AND WHY IT
MATTERS6
There are three main points to Norris’s argument. First, he clari-
fies the country’s interests in calling domestic extremist attacks “ter-
rorism,” and doing so at the formal (criminal legal) level.7 Second he
describes several ways by which this could be accomplished—one
option is to write a new domestic terrorism statute, however he also
3Most notably in the blog Lawfare. See sources cited supra, note 1.
4Republican Senator Martha McSally of Arizona has circulated a discussion
draft of a possible domestic terrorism statute, https://www.mcsally.senate.gov/sites/
default/files/2019-08/Discussion%20Draft%20DT.pdf. Democratic Rep. Adam Schiff
of California has proposed H.R. 4192 Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism
Act 116th Congress (2019-2020) https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/hous
e-bill/4192/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22hr+4192%22%5D%7D=1=1;
Republican Representative Andy Weber Senior of Texas has proposed H.R.4187 -
Domestic Terrorism Penalties Act of 2019 116th Congress (2019-2020) https://www.
congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4187/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A
%5B%22domestic+terrorism%22%5D%7D=3=1.
5For criticisms of inequality, see Khaled A. Beydoun, Lone Wolf Terrorism:
Types, Stripes, and Double Standards, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1213 (2018); Caroline
Mala Corbin, Essay, Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never White: At the Intersec-
tion of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 455 (2017); Tung
Yin, Were Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber the Only White Terrorists? Race,
Religion, and the Perception of Terrorism, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 33 (2013). For
explorations of the legal divide, other than the two articles discussed here, see
Dianne Webber, Preparing to Commit Domestic Terrorist Activity: Does the United
States Have Adequate Tools to Stop This? 34 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 205 (2018) (sug-
gesting the United States needs a preparatory statute such as those used in the
United Kingdom); Katie Dilts, One of These Things Is Not Like the Other: Federal
Law’s Inconsistent Treatment of Domestic and International Terrorism, 50 U. PAC. L.
REV. 711 (2019); Nathan Carpenter, Note, The Ad Hoc Federal Crime of Terrorism:
Why Congress Needs to Amend the Statute to Adequately Address Domestic Extrem-
ism, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 393 (2018).
6See Jesse Norris, Why Dylann Roof Is a Terrorist Under Federal law, and
Why It Matters, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259 (2017).
7Norris, supra note 6, at 283–92.
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suggests that there are routes in our existing legal framework.8
Third, Norris suggests using a simplified definition of terrorism, to
avoid the existing pitfalls.9
Norris begins with an emotional and moral appeal to equivalence
between the two types of violence. Detailing the violence and horror
of Dylann Roof’s 2015 attack on a church in Charleston, Norris
highlights and contextualizes the dilemma described by McCord—
why should this attack be addressed as a hate crime rather than ter-
rorism?10 He argues that this decision has its roots in a history of
systemic and purposeful racism, which continues in the comparative
deprioritization of right-wing terrorism investigations as opposed to
murders committed by Muslim extremists.11 This is evident, he sug-
gests, in the reluctance of journalists and federal officials to call
such attacks “terrorism,”12 as well as in the lack of resources offered
to domestic terrorism investigations.13
Whatever the roots of the differences in language, investigation,
charging, and sentencing decisions, the decisions have important
practical consequences. Socially, Norris highlights the expressive
nature of the criminal law. Failure to attempt to treat “white terrorism”
as terrorism “denigrate[s] the seriousness of the offense . . . [and]
would be easily interpreted as suggesting that white supremacist ter-
rorism is less important or blameworthy than jihadi terrorism.”14 In
contrast, calling the crime terrorism and formally treating it as such
could aid in
acknowledging the long history of white supremacist terrorism in the
U.S., placing moral opprobrium on racist violence, reducing Islamopho-
bia by disentangling the stereotypical conflation of terrorism and Islam,
and ensuring that citizens understand the importance of non-Muslim
terrorism, so that they be more likely to report [extremists] to the
government.15
The decision also has important policy ramifications. Pursuing the
case as a terrorism case highlights to the public that there is an
ongoing issue to be addressed. Norris suggests that this is prefer-
8Norris, supra note 6, at 273–83, 292–95.
9Norris, supra note 6, at 295–98.
10Norris, supra note 6, at 259–62.
11Norris, supra note 6, at 269–71.
12Norris, supra note 6, at 269–71.
13Norris, supra note 6, 271.
14Norris, supra note 6, at 280.
15Norris, supra note 6, at 283. In particular, see Section IV.B of Norris’s article
for a discussion of the potential social consequences of such a change, including
confronting racism and racist terrorism, balancing media coverage, countering
Islamophobia, and enhancing public cooperation in the prevention of terrorism. Nor-
ris, supra note 6, at 287–92.
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able to dismissing such cases as repeated but somehow isolated
outbursts by persons with mental illnesses (by which logic, Norris
states, they are often set aside and forgotten).16 Allowing this
dismissal also takes pressure off of government agencies, and
thereby lessens accountability.17 Using the terrorism label reinforces
the notion that the government has a responsibility to prevent these
attacks and to formulate a coherent policy by which to do so.18 Such
pressure should also result in redirection of greater resources to
investigate domestic terrorism (in sharp contrast to the diminishing
of resources that has been recently reported).19
The question for Norris, however, is what the government can do
about this; it is here where we begin to explore the legal distinctions
between domestic and international terrorism, and the arguable
inadequacy of the current framework to pursue domestic terrorists.
As Norris points out, there is no federal crime of committing terror-
ism or of being a terrorist.20
Terrorism is defined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331, but no criminal penal-
ties are attached to that definition. Instead, specific actions, such as
use of weapons of mass destruction, attacks on federal facilities, or
murder than transcends national boundaries are criminalized—with
no terroristic intent necessary, even for those crimes listed under the
Terrorism Chapter of the U.S. Code, or with “terrorism” in the name
of the specific statute.21 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) offers a list of
“federal crimes of terrorism,” but conviction for those crimes does
not rely on the definition of terrorism under § 2331. These crimes
may be prosecuted independent of the terrorism label and they
become crimes of terrorism for sentencing purposes when “calcu-
lated to influence the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.”22 These
statutes often rely on transnational activity, attacks on federal facili-
ties or employees, or large scale attacks using weapons of war23—
16Norris, supra note 6, at 284.
17Norris, supra note 6, at 285.
18Norris, supra note 6, at 285.
19Norris, supra note 6, at 286–87.
20Norris, supra note 6, at 278.
21See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2332a (“Use of weapons of mass destruction”); 18
U.S.C.A. § 844(f) (“Importation, manufacture, distribution and storage of explosive
materials”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b (“Acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries”).
22Norris, supra note 6, at 279 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5)).
23Norris, supra note 6, at 279 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5)); see also
Jane Chong, White Hate but Islamic Terror? Charleston, Hate Crimes and Terrorism
Per Quod, LAWFARE (June 21, 2015, 10:00PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/white-h
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all of which are more frequent in classic terrorism overseas and less
frequent in contemporary domestic terrorism.24
The most commonly charged “terrorism statutes” are those that
criminalize offering support to a foreign terrorist organization, creat-
ing more options to pursue foreign-inspired terrorism under the ter-
rorism label, without offering a comparable option for domestic
terrorism.25 But Norris argues Roof qualifies under the definition in
§ 2331, and therefore, federal authorities should feel free to refer to
him as a terrorist in press releases, briefings, investigations, and
when classifying the investigation for official purposes.26 Since Nor-
ris’s concerns primarily involve the message that is sent to the public,
these purposes are not insignificant.
A more tangible application of the terrorism definition comes in the
form of sentencing. Norris recounts three ways Roof’s behavior may
make him eligible for a stiffer, terrorism-related sentence, even
without being charged under a federal crime of terrorism. The first is
the terrorism sentencing enhancement, which may apply to
sentences for any crime that was “intended to promote a federal
crime of terrorism” (those being the federal crimes listed under 18
U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5).27 The second is upward departure to the
same degree as the enhancement, as recommended by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission in notes accompanying the enhancement.28
Both would result in large changes in sentencing. When applied, the
enhancement increases a crime’s offense level by 12 to not less
than 32, and increases criminal history level to VI.29 As Norris points
out, a 10 year sentence may turn into a life sentence under this
enhancement;30 others refer to one case where a sentence that
would otherwise have been fewer than five years became 155 years
ate-islamic-terror-charleston-hate-crimes-and-terrorism-quod; Hennessy, supra note
1.
24See, e.g., MARK S. HAMM & RAMóN SPAAIJ, THE AGE OF LONE WOLF TERRORISM
35–58 (2017) (Chapter 3, discussing the prevalence of lone wolves in modern ter-
rorism and the development of lone wolf attacks away from bombs and towards the
use of firearms and motor vehicle attacks).
25See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
26Norris, supra note 6, at 278.
27Norris, supra note 6, at 279–80 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 3A1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015)).
28Norris, supra note 6, at 281 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4
cmt. n.2, n.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015)).
29U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
30Norris, supra note 6, at 279.
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based on the enhancement.31 Finally, in addition to the two options
to enhance sentences, committing an offense in order to “commit an
act of terrorism” (likely interpreted as falling under 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2331) is an aggravating factor to present to a jury in a death eligible
case.
In the cases of defendants like Roof, who have successfully com-
mitted mass killings as part of a terrorist attack, this severity offers
little practical effect, which Norris acknowledges. “[A] recommended
sentence of 400 years instead of 200 years” would hardly affect a
person’s life.32 But he argues that it should be applied anyway based
on the communicative purposes listed above.33 Additionally, and for
the same reasons, Norris argues both that a new terrorism statute
should be written, criminalizing any murder committed “with the
intend to advance, publicize, or express an ideology,”34 and that the
definition of terrorism should be simplified to reflect the same
understanding of terrorists’ motivations.35
Overall, Norris’s argument comes down to a plea to simplify ter-
rorism legislation so that it might more easily apply to domestic as
well as international terrorists. This is reflected not only in his calls
for a new statute and a new definition, but also in his discussion of
the current definition, as discussed above. Although Norris maintains
that hate crimes and terrorism are different (he states, the difference
is planning and ideology),36 he also repeatedly refers to hate crimes
as domestic terrorism,37 and his explanation as to why the terrorism
label applies to Roof relies on this simplification as well.
In order to argue that prosecuting Roof for hate crimes is insuf-
ficient, Norris must show that Roof qualifies as a terrorist. First, he
addresses the definition of terrorism offered by the U.S. code—that
terrorism consists of otherwise criminal activities that are “dangerous
to human life” and “appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce
a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government
by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”38 He largely
31WADIE SAID, CRIMES OF TERROR: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL
TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 125 (2015).
32Norris, supra note 6, at 281.
33Norris, supra note 6, at 281.
34Norris, supra note 6, at 293.
35Norris, supra note 6, at 295.
36Norris, supra note 6, at 262.
37Norris, supra note 6, at 262, 272.
38Norris, supra note 6, at 273–74 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331). Norris specifi-
cally cites § 2331(5), which defines domestic terrorism. Both domestic and
FROM THE LEGAL LITERATURE
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dismisses the third option,39 but states that Roof would qualify as a
terrorist under both of the first two because “Roof’s attack was,
without any doubt, intended to intimidate the African-American
community.”40 Norris’s basis for this statement is Roof’s own
manifesto, wherein he stated that he wanted to “stimulate white
supremacist action” in order to “start a race war.”41
But Norris reveals himself when he states “[a]ny murder motivated
by a racist ideology is inherently intimidating to the hated population,
and any attacker committing such murder clearly intends for that
intimidation to occur.”42 “It is so because we all know it is so” is not
proof of intent. Later, while discussing whether or not Roof intended
to influence government policy, Norris notes the possibility that Roof
might have wanted to stimulate a war without influencing govern-
ment policy, which he quickly dismisses because “such a ‘war’ could
not take place without” policy changes.43 He does not, however,
consider the possibility that Roof might be trying to start a war that is
simply a war—not a war of terrorism. This contradicts most social
science research on terrorism, wherein the distinction between war
and terrorism (or insurgency and terrorism) is one of the primary
areas of about the definition of terrorism, with a general agreement
that war, even asymmetrical guerilla or insurgent warfare, is not
terrorism.44
Still, Norris is far from being the only scholar to reduce the mean-
ing of terrorism to such a simplified form. Indeed, Shirin Sinnar does
the same when exploring the legal differences between domestic
and international terrorism, but comes to a sharply different conclu-
sion as to the remedy.
international terrorism are defined in § 2331, the only difference between them be-
ing whether the activity occurs primarily in the United States or transcends national
boundaries. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(1)(c) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(5)(c)).
39Norris, supra note 6, at 277.
40Norris, supra note 6, at 262. In particular, see the discussion of Roof’s intent
and how he fits the definition of a terrorist. Norris, supra note 6, at 273–76.
41Norris, supra note 6, at 275–76.
42Norris, supra note 6, at 274.
43Norris, supra note 6, at 276.
44See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 35–36 (2006); Martha Crenshaw, The
Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century, 21 POL. PSYCHOL. 405,
406 (2000) (“Terrorism is preeminently political and symbolic, whereas guerrilla
warfare is a military activity”); Alex Schmid, Terrorism — The Definitional Problem,
36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 375, 381–84 (2004).
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III. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE LAW OF “DOMESTIC” AND “INTERNATIONAL”
TERRORISM45
In “Separate and Unequal,” Shirin Sinnar gives a more detailed
introduction to the practical differences in investigations into
domestic and international terrorism. First, she paints a picture of
the divide, covering surveillance, prosecution, and sentencing.46
Next, rather than focusing on the need for expressive punishment,
she turns to the legal reasoning behind these divisions and suggests
that it is faulty.47 Finally she suggests her solution—to curtail some
of the invasions of liberty that are allowed in the international sphere,
rather than creating new and broader inroads into the domestic
realm.48
Sinnar’s description of the many and varied ways the “domestic”
versus “international” divide influences an investigation and prosecu-
tion brings new light to what has been a murky and hidden aspect of
this highly publicized criminal law. She also acknowledges the lack
of a terrorism statute to address much of the domestic terrorism we
see today,49 although like Norris, Sinnar collapses the definition of
terrorism to “political violence”, thereby avoiding the need to clarify
which domestic actions she would include under the heading.50 But
Sinnar also highlights additional areas where the distinction creates
a difference.
The division is also seen in the amount and lack of oversight of
surveillance, where the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act [FISA]
allows the use of FISA orders to eavesdrop instead of requiring Title
III warrants. This allows for longer surveillance without the need for
reapplication, more secrecy surrounding the surveillance, and almost
no opportunity to appeal its legality (or, therefore, suppress evidence
therefrom).51 Additionally, FISA orders are not the only surveillance
method particularly allowed in international cases. Sinnar notes that
Section 2015 of the USA PATRIOT Act allows access to business
records, phone records, tax returns, and “tangible things,” while
National Security Letters allow the FBI to obtain “records from
electronic communications providers, consumer reporting agencies,
45Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “International”
Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333 (2019).
46Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1343–66.
47Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1367–94.
48Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1394–1404.
49Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1337, 1352.
50Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1343.
51Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1344–46.
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and financial institutions without judicial approval.”52 These orders
are sent out via boilerplate language, at the rate of “tens of
thousands . . . a year.”53 While they are available for domestic
cases, in domestic cases they are used with less secrecy and higher
legal standards.54 Finally, FBI informants operate with less oversight
in international terrorism investigations and of course, informants
may well create terror plots or an international (and federal) nexus
over the course of a sting.55
In the area of prosecution, while it is true that an international
nexus may lead to the availability of statutes that are not available
for domestic prosecutions,56 a more extreme difference comes in the
availability of material support statutes. Material support prosecu-
tions have been central to federal terrorism prosecutions since
2001.57 Two material support statutes, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2339A and
2339B, criminalize providing “material support” to terrorism and to
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, respectively. They are a vital tool for
prosecutors because they enable preventive action—arrests may
occur well before any violent act has been committed, or even solely
on the basis of speech supporting terrorism, or, in connection with
conspiracy, “terrorism” arrests may be even further removed from
violence.58 While 2339A (criminalizing knowingly offering material
support that will be used to commit a federal crime of terrorism) can
be used against domestic terrorists, it is used rarely even in the
international context,59 and is based on the same federal crimes of
52Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1349.
53Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1349.
54Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1349.
55Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1349, 1350, 1356.
56Such as 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b, which allows a prosecution for “Acts of terror-
ism transcending national boundaries” for crimes as simple as serious assault or
property damage, when it involves “conduct transcending national boundaries.” Sin-
nar, supra note 45, at 1353.
57Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 19–20 (2005); Domestic Terrorism
Prosecutions Outnumber International, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE
(Sept. 21, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/481/.
58Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1355–56.
59A report by the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School, for
instance, showed that over ninety ISIS-related cases contained charges under 18
U.S.C.A. § 2339b, while fewer than twenty contained charges under § 2339A.
Statistical Analysis: Isis Cases in the United States, 3/1/2014 — 5/8/2017, CTR. ON
NAT’L SEC. AT FORDHAM LAW 3 (Sept. 13, 2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/591095c89de4bb0a23961069/1494259145920/ISIS+
Case+Update+5-8-2017.pdf.
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terrorism that largely self-limit to international activity.60 However, 18
U.S.C.A. § 2339B is truly the prosecutors’ darling, and by its own
terms it is limited to foreign organizations, pre-designated by the
Secretary of State.61 This means that while “international” terrorists
could be arrested for conspiring to translate texts for al Qaeda,62
domestic terrorists may be prosecuted under terrorism statutes only
if some actual act of violence is planned. This lopsidedness returns
in the terrorism sentencing enhancement, which Sinnar addresses
next, noting that the enhancement has been applied in domestic
cases but is only when actual violence is planned, as it is also based
on the listed federal crimes of terrorism.63
Having discussed the practical ramifications of the divide, Sinnar
turns to the legal reasoning behind it, asserting that the concerns
resulting in protection of domestic speech and activity apply equally
as strongly in the realm of international activities. She begins with
the First Amendment implications of banning material support
(including some support that might be considered political speech)
of domestic organizations. She finds the argument that it is less of-
fensive to the First Amendment to restrict the speech of foreign
organizations than domestic unconvincing, arguing that speech
involving international organizations is also a “meaningful” area of
domestic political argument.64 She dismisses the risk of government
targeting political adversaries with the claim that this abuse is already
possible, and arguably present, in the international arena “foreign
designations equally tempt leaders to target U.S. communities for
disfavored ideas or because of racial or ethnic status.”65 She also
addresses the possibility that material support statutes are a neces-
sary last resort in the international domain (in contrast to domesti-
cally, where the United States maintains normal policing powers),
but determines that U.S. powers overseas are strong enough that
this should not be a concern.66
Similarly, in the realm of Fourth Amendment protections (and
FISA), Sinnar argues that the government has no greater interest in
flexibility in foreign investigations than in domestic. The reach of
FISA broadened after 2001, undermining this division, the chal-
lenges of international surveillance (cited as one way in which the
FISA court has distinguished foreign from domestic investigations)
60Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1357.
61Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1355.
62Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1355–56.
63Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1360.
64Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1369.
65Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1370.
66Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1371–73.
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are now similar in domestic investigations. Judges have no less
understanding of foreign groups than they do of domestic groups
(and therefore need not be more deferential). “[V]iolence by
[domestic] groups may threaten society as much as, or more than,
the displeasure of foreign states.” And the broad reach of FISA—to
individuals whose international connections are limited to a few
websites—destroys the logical consistency of any argument that
domestic and foreign investigations substantially differ.67
She treats federalism concerns similarly, arguing both that
Constitutional law could accept a domestic terror statute (basing
jurisdiction either on the scale of the harm, the use of interstate
commerce, or both), and that those principles that weigh against
such an expansion of federal power (such as maintaining greater
democratic accountability and a lack of institutional competence)
would apply equally to international terrorism.68 Here, again, the
prevalence of the “new” terrorism becomes relevant, as the
decentralized nature of modern terrorism (largely driven by the plots
of individuals rather than massive organizational planning) has
brought a greater resemblance between domestic and international-
inspired terrorist attacks.69
The change in contemporary terror tactics then returns in Sinnar’s
analysis of the comparative scale of the threat posed by international
versus domestic terrorism. While she acknowledges that this
comparison is difficult to make, as it is always difficult to assess the
level of dangerousness of any terrorist organization,70 she presents
reason to believe domestic and international terrorists may well pose
comparable threats. For support she relies both on the known efforts
of domestic groups to obtain weapons of mass destruction and the
nature of modern terrorism, that seems to rely more heavily on unaf-
filiated attacks using firearms and vehicular homicide.71
To Sinnar, the problem with these disparities is not only that it is
logically inconsistent, but that it is so easy to replace “international”
with “Muslim.” Terrorism may be deemed international because it is
“motivated by a ‘transnational ideology,’ ’’72 and “the court might
interpret a person inspired by ISIS to be acting ‘for or on behalf of’
the group, even if she had no contact with the group.”73 This leads to
clearly disproportional protections between purely domestic citizens
67Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1376–77.
68Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1378–86.
69Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1384.
70Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1387–88.
71Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1390–91.
72Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1347.
73Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1348.
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influenced by an extremist (Islamist) ideology as opposed to purely
domestic citizens influenced by extremist (white supremacist) ideol-
ogy, even if that domestic, white supremacist ideology also has roots
in a global white supremacist movement.74 It also lends itself to the
types of social abuses and ramifications that Norris describes,75 and
Sinnar similarly explores both the influence of racism in the creation
of this division, and its effects in reinforcing that racism.76
But while Sinnar sees many of the same problems Norris does,
her conclusion is strikingly different. Focusing on these criticisms
and her arguments that the interests protecting domestic political
activity from interference are also reflected in the international
sphere, Sinnar argues that these interests mandate the government
return these protections to U.S. citizens and others implicated in
international terrorism cases.77 She notes that these developments
regarding foreign terrorist organizations have already received a
good deal of scholarly criticism for many of the same reasons that
she offered,78 and acknowledges the concern that such an expan-
sion in the domestic realm would have serious ramifications for
disfavored political groups.79 She also notes that non-criminal
responses to terrorism might be more effective.80
So, if the desire is to undo disproportionality in terrorism investiga-
tions and prosecutions and creating a domestic terrorism statute or
list of domestic terrorist organizations is not a good solution, she
suggests fixing international terrorism investigations and prosecu-
tions instead. Specifically, she suggests increasing oversight and ac-
countability, including of foreign intelligence gathering, requiring a
greater international connection before an investigation is offered
FISA authority, and eliminating 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (criminalizing
material support to a foreign terrorist organization) or limiting its ap-
plication so that it no longer can be used to prosecute speech.81
Overall, Sinnar offers an important analysis of the legal framework
for terrorism and its implications. Readers may still argue about
whether she adequately responds to the argument that a different
and specific threat to democracy is posed by government surveil-
lance of domestic groups, and that this threat might justify offering
74Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1337.
75See generally supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.
76Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1361–66, 1395–97.
77Sinnar, supra note 45, 1394–1404.
78These criticisms are summarized by Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1400.
79Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1401.
80Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1402.
81Sinnar, supra note 45, at 1403–04.
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added protections to domestic groups,82 thereby necessitating this
division. And it is easy to imagine the cynical response many might
offer to her solution, perhaps best encapsulated by Norris’s state-
ment—“Realistically . . . the government will continue,” so it should
at least be consistent.83 In turn, Sinnar’s work is an important
counterpoint to Norris’s, highlighting the extent of the invasion that
the government’s current surveillance authorities are in terrorism
cases, and reminding us that increasing that power is not necessar-
ily desirable. Her scholarship is an irreplaceable addition to the
understanding of this discrepancy so many have complained about
and the complexity of resolving it. Both articles should be read and
considered by those who are interested in moving this issue forward.
82See generally supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
83See Sinnar, supra note 45, at 506 (referring to government’s insistence on
using the term “terrorism”).
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